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Conspiracy theories, credibility 
and trust in information 
 
Abstract 
The rapid spread of social media on the Internet has resulted 
in strong changes in the information and communication 
landscape. Their inadequate use has given rise to new 
discussions on truth and post-truth, what is trustworthy and 
what is questionable, the credibility of messages and their 
sources. Through this article we aim to examine what 
citizens believe about the information they receive and if 
they feel whether or not there is withholding of information. 
This will be achieved through data obtained from a survey of 
a statistically representative sample of the Andalusian 
population over the age of 18 (1,103 respondents, with a 
maximum margin of error of +/- 3%). One of the main results 
of this research is the serious lack of credibility of the 
information received, as many Andalusians (68.1%) believe 
that information is withheld from them. We have also 
observed several factors explaining a greater likelihood of 
finding a high belief in the conspiracy theory on the 
withholding of information. Finally, the article reflects on 
the consequences of mistrust in information and we propose 
an inter- and transdisciplinary approach in order to 
counteract this mistrust. 
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Credibility, trustworthiness, disinformation, conspiracy 
theories, post-truth. 
 
1. Introduction: From propaganda to post-truth 
From the times of Ancient Egypt, when in 1279 BC Pharaoh Ramses II etched in stone his 
alleged fake victory against the Hittites (Weir, 2009), in present-day Syria, the history of 
propaganda details the use of rumours, lies, disinformation and conspiracy, with numerous 
references and precedents (Domenach, 1963; Durandin; 1983; Jay, 2010) of past practices, rules 
and techniques still in use today. 
To conspire, from its Roman origin (conspiratio), showed a positive sense of solidarity as 
used by Tacitus and Cicero, implying the pursuit of the common good, the air that helps us 
“breathe together” and share the same breath in the favourable direction in which “the wind 
blows” (García-Noblejas, 1998). A positive conspiracy in the dissemination of ideas where, over 
time, the media would play an essential role, not only as transmitters, but also as creators of 
shared experiences, in accordance with the classical model of participation and “ritual” 
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described by Carey (1989). This shows us that within communication lies our level of certainty 
or insecurity about reality and about what others do with their lives. 
Communication is a human biological need (Rúas & García, 2018) and a result of our 
condition as social animals. Being social animals, we also enjoy storytelling and the pleasure 
of sharing apparently new, original and exclusive stories, and the sensation of handling 
privileged and alternative information beyond routine and the regular processes of news 
generation and dissemination. 
In the age of information and manipulation (including the creation of newsworthy 
pseudo-events), televised infotainment and fiction currently provide us with a new dimension 
of reality based on the concept of post-truth (Harsin, 2015), the felt and perceived truth, where 
facts matter less than the sensations and emotions they provoke (Rúas & Capdevila, 2017). The 
term post-truth had already been used by Steve Tesich (1992) to compare the concealment of 
the Watergate case facts with the Iraq War. This was later developed by sociologist Ralph 
Keyes (2004) to refer to the creative manipulation of truth, embellished and shaped to the 
taste of audiences. Post-truth has also been defined as an emotive lie (Hernández, 2017), given 
its close relationship with manipulation, demagogy and propaganda. 
A reality constructed according to our desires, ideas and cognition that acquires new 
senses of experience through new methods of communication, thanks to the Internet and 
social media. These mark the start of a post-modern age of political communication and 
relationships between politics and the media and within the media itself, in the face of 
competition between traditional and new media in an increasingly fragmented media 
environment (Rúas, Mazaira & Rodríguez, 2018). 
Events such as the latest US elections, with Donald Trump’s victory, add new 
interpretations and a new dimension to the meaning and journalistic scope of the word “lie”. 
This is a current subject of discussion between American journalists and editors to discern 
when to use that word, given the moral and intentional judgement it implies and the imitation 
and contagion effect –and even trivialisation– that its use and abuse can deliver in informative 
texts (Taksdal, 2017). 
2. Credibility versus disinformation 
Credibility is related to a necessary attribution of quality (Cabedoche, 2015) and the perceived 
trustworthiness of a message, source or media, which depends on the simultaneous 
interaction between them and on multiple dimensions, such as bias and precision (Meyer, 
1988; Flanagin & Metzger, 2007). 
Credibility also constitutes a professional variable that determines the reputation of a 
media outlet, including both its behaviour (its journalistic and business reality) and its 
recognition, namely the assessment made by audiences and interest groups of that reality and 
the professional functioning, according to the fulfilment of their expectations (Ortiz, Villafañe 
& Caffarel, 2018). 
The recent economic crisis affected the structure and business model of media outlets 
(Campos-Freire, 2010). Both public and private organisations are driven to legitimise their 
activity and look for intangible and non-monetary assets that strengthen their corporate 
reputation, trustworthiness and credibility (Luoma-aho & Makikangas, 2014; Timoteo, 2015). 
The decline in public trust and the loss of credibility of institutions opened the door to 
news based on alternative sources of information, different from traditional and official ones. 
Governments, small and medium-sized enterprises and large international corporations 
fight to make a profit and bring added value (engagement) to their image (Dincer & Uslaner, 
2010), a process where public and private monitoring faces new challenges and threats 
through Big Data and automated surveillance. 
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The constant increase in communication expenditure in the last decade by government 
institutions, political parties, businesses and NGOs contrasts with the gradual decline in 
public trust, causing what has been identified as a collapse of public communication 
(Macnamara, 2018). 
The Edelman Trust Barometer 20181 notes that only 43% of people trust their national 
governments and media, compared to 52% of people who trust national companies, and 53% 
who trust NGOs. Out of the 100 countries surveyed on this barometer, Spain ranks slightly 
below average (47) in public trust level. 
With regard to the media, in the case of Spain, information professionals themselves 
acknowledge the loss of quality of information, related to the media’s lack of political and 
economic independence, as reflected, for example, in the Informe anual de la Profesión 
Periodística [Annual Report of the Journal Profession in Spain] by the Association of Journalists 
of Madrid (APM, 2017)2. 
APM’s report history shows a slight improvement in the information Spaniards received 
from the media in 2016 compared to 2015 (5.7 and 5.5 points, respectively). APM´s work also 
demonstrates the concern of those who work in information who, when asked about the 
causes of society’s critical opinion towards the media, identified the tendency towards 
spectacularisation (48.3%) and the lack of rigour and quality of information (40.8%) (APM, 
2016)3 as the principal causes. In any case, concern about information credibility has been 
consistent in journalism for more than a decade, during which time most professionals 
consulted considered that media credibility progressively worsened (APM, 2004 and 2005)4. 
Several democratic countries are experiencing increased levels of false information 
imitating journalistic formats, through information tied to both nationalist movements 
(mainly right-wing radicals) and foreign (mainly Russian) and aimed, in most cases, at 
undermining institutional legitimacy and destabilising political parties, governments and 
nations (Bennett & Livingston, 2018), clearly disrupting democracy. 
In this regard, the so-called computational propaganda, based on the use of hackers and 
contamination of information –through bots and digital “drivers” who are part of a process of 
simulation on social media (Sánchez, 2018)5– is attributable to geostrategic operations 
attempting to disrupt public agenda and distort national or foreign political mood. This was 
the case as recently reported in the United Kingdom and Spain, who accused Russia of 
spreading fake news in order to influence their respective elections (Patel, 2017) and also in 
our country on the occasion of the Catalan referendum. 
Hybrid threats by state and non-state actors, as defined by the European Commission 
itself (2017), including online piracy, financial manipulation, monetary destabilisation or 
money laundering, as well as disinformation campaigns using social media to control political 
narrative or radicalise, recruit and direct people in order to intervene in the spheres of 
influence, destabilise the most powerful supranational structures and create a new world 
order (Cirdei & Ispas, 2017). 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) has warned for years about the global danger of 
massive digital disinformation as a technological and geopolitical risk and a challenge 
showing the need to help citizens access reliable information that allows participation in 
public debates and social decision-making (Howell, 2013). 
  
                                            
1 http://cms.edelman.com/sites/default/files/2018-02/2018_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report_FEB.pdf. 
2 https://www.apmadrid.es/publicaciones/informe-anual-de-la-profesion/. 
3 Idem. 
4 Idem. 
5 A bot (from the word “robot”) is a fake, active account linked to a Twitter account management tool which is used 
to retweet (RT), follow other accounts or create trends to become trending topic (TT) (Sánchez, 2018). 
Gualda, E. & Rúas, J. 
Conspiracy theories, credibility and trust in information 
ISSN 2386-7876 – © 2019 Communication & Society, 32(1), 179-194 
182 
Disinformation, understood as an intentional falsehood disseminated as news or in an 
informative format with a political goal, intends a systematic interruption of common 
informational flows through deceit. Disinformation’s amplifying effect threatens political 
institutions and democratic values. 
As noted by Tuñón (2017), the disparity in knowledge of international reality between a 
misinformed majority and a well-informed minority, between public opinion and the political 
elite, can be dangerous for national interests in democratic terms, as national positions on 
external affairs tend to reflect the particular interests of the political elites and not those of 
the middle class. This is the case whenever figures such as international correspondents are 
forced to leave due to cost reduction in favour of the dissemination of information flows 
spurred by the spread of new technologies and the commodification of information. 
If fake news’ dissemination and proliferation is evident, so is the proliferation of 
conspiracy theories on social media with different goals that can cause significant harm. This 
is not a trivial matter if we consider the information provided by the Eurobarometer 464 on 
“Fake News and Disinformation Online” conducted in 2018, which shows Spaniard’s high 
degree of belief in being exposed to fake news. In particular, 78% of Spaniards believe they are 
exposed to fake news at least once a week, and 53% every day or almost every day. 
Problematically, only 13% are certain they can identify this kind of news. 
There is an equally clear perception that this fake news can have detrimental effects on 
democracy (High-Level Expert Group on Fake news and Disinformation, 2018; European 
Commission, 2018). Similar results appear in different European countries. On the other hand, 
citizens admit that the proliferation of fake news through social media is very confusing6, as 
evidenced by a Pew Research Center poll conducted among American citizens, the results of 
which show that almost a quarter of respondents (23%) claimed to have spread fake news to 
their contacts on social media, either intentionally or involuntarily (Barthel, Mitchell & 
Holcomb, 2016; Barthel & Mitchell 2017). 
The media have evident socio-economic interests, something analysed from the 
perspective of Communicating Economic Policy (CEP) in order to find out how media and 
communicative systems reinforce, face or affect existing social and class relations, with a 
special focus on their ownership structure, modes and financing, and communication policies 
according to which they operate (Mosco, 1996). 
In this regard, it is evident how economic value outweighs social, cultural or 
informational value and, ultimately, how the media form part of the economic power 
structure and the power elite (Segovia, 2017), of which social media is also a faithful reflection 
(Rúas, Mazaira & Rodríguez, 2018), something that undoubtedly generates mistrust. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Objectives, research questions and working hypothesis 
This article, based on quantitative data from a survey conducted in Andalusia, aims to respond 
to the following objective or research question: what Andalusians believe regarding the 
information they receive and whether they think this information is being withheld from 
them. This question connects with what we proposed previously about the quality, credibility 
and trustworthiness of the information reaching the public (Cabedoche, 2015), but also, as we 
will explain in the following pages, brings us closer to the conspiracy theory that information 
is being withheld from the public. 
                                            
6 While a well-crafted communication process involves the correct transfer of information, confusion is, on the 
contrary, the consequence of faulty information which leaves the receiver in a state of uncertainty or 
misunderstanding. A state of confusion can be defined as the mirror image of communication, as noted by Watzlawick 
(1994). 
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In order to answer this question, we have utilised one of the five items used in 
international literature to build what is known as the generic conspiracist beliefs scale, 
specifically the item that brings us back to the belief that: “Many very important things happen 
in the world, which the public is never informed about”. In the literature on belief in 
conspiracy theories, two common assessment strategies are identified in studies based on 
surveys. Some of which use scales gauging generic beliefs, while others address the 
assessment of beliefs in specific conspiracy theories. 
There is also research that has included both approaches. For the purposes of this article, 
we will focus on the global belief that the population may have regarding whether they are 
informed about relevant developments occurring around the world. This item, along with 
others, has been applied in several countries through a questionnaire designed to measure 
conspiracy mentality, known as the “Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ)”, which has 
several tested versions with more or fewer items (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah & 
Imhoff, 2013; Imhoff & Bruder, 2013; Moulding, Nix-Carnell, Schnabel, Nedeljkovic, Burnside, 
Lentini, et al. 2016; Lantian, Muller, Nurra & Douglas, 2016; Swami, Barron, Weis, Voracek, 
Stieger & Furnham, 2017). 
It is, according to Swami, Barron, Weis, Voracek, Stieger & Furnham (2017), one of the 
four widely used scales found in the study of conspiracy theories. According to Bruder, Haffke, 
Neave, Nouripanah & Imhoff (2013), this questionnaire and study of scientific conspiracies “is 
designed to efficiently assess differences in the generic tendency to engage in conspiracist 
ideation within and across cultures.” 
In this article, apart from understanding Andalusians’ perception about whether they are 
informed about relevant events occurring in the world, we are interested in identifying the 
sociological profile of people who strongly believe that the general public is not informed 
about several important things in the world, which indicates a high degree of mistrust and 
suspicion towards the information they receive. We are equally interested in furthering our 
understanding in this area and clarifying which factors seem to have the greatest predictive 
capacity of this high belief that information is being withheld from them. 
One of the aspects that may be linked to the predisposition to being suspicious about the 
information received, as a working hypothesis, is the tendency to believe in other conspiracy 
theories, to the extent that it has been documented that there is a certain predisposition to 
see the world from the prism of conspiracy theories (Butter, 2014). In addition, in the face of 
the evidence that conspiracy beliefs are common, Uscinski, Klofstad & Atkinson (2016) raise 
the question of why so many people believe in them, based on previous surveys. 
One could think that being indiscriminately exposed to the use and consumption of social 
media and new media is linked to a lower capacity for critical thinking and a higher likelihood 
of believing in conspiracies. Uscinski, Klofstad & Atkinson (2016) suggest that at present day 
there is great concern about the fact that, if conspiracy theories are widely discussed in the 
media and on the Internet, this could influence the public and condition them to wrongly 
believe in them. However, in their experimental work, they show how this kind of information 
seems to affect only those individuals more likely to accept a conspiracy logic. They conclude 
that the predispositions, and not information, make individuals see conspiracy theories 
behind different events. On the other hand, they argue that partisanship influences the 
tendency to see a conspiracy theory, but not in every circumstance, only when this has 
partisan elements. 
Other hypotheses to be explored –considering existing international literature in several 
fields connected to conspiracy theories– is that several factors such as ideology and level of 
education affect the proclivity for being mistrustful or expressing this type of global criticism 
or beliefs that the mighty use their power to hide information. For example, regarding 
education, we consider, within the meaning of the recent work by Van Prooijen (2017), that 
highly educated people are less likely to believe in conspiracy theories than people with a 
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lower level of education, although the reason why remains unknown. The relationships 
between education and conspiracy theories cannot be reduced to a simple mechanism, as they 
are the complex interaction of several psychological factors linked to education, as suggested 
by this author. Other studies (Krouwel, Kutiyski, Jan-Willem, Martinsson & Markstedt, 2017) 
find links between ideology and conspiracy theories, as well as between ideology and 
economic assessments. Relationships between conspiracy theories and interpersonal trust 
and trust in politicians are not that evident. 
In the following pages, we explore Andalusians’ opinions on the belief or suspicion that 
they are not receiving adequate information about what is happening in the world. Insofar as 
the results show a trend towards a high support for this belief, they implicitly suggest a 
critique of the credibility of information and a mistrust that could be equally related to the 
consumption patterns of less traditional or modern media, as well as the social media used by 
Andalusians’ in their daily lives. 
3.2. Sample and field work7 
This research has been conducted within the 5th Wave of the Citizen Panel for Social Research 
PIE 201710E018 [PACIS Citizen Panel, IESA-CSIC, www.panelpacis.net]. The work is based on 
the survey of a representative sample of Andalusians. The sample size is 1,103 interviews. The 
universe of this research was defined as people aged 18 or over living in Andalusia. For data 
capture, the sample was selected from members of the PACIS panel. 
Members of the PACIS Panel were selected in person in people’s homes by qualified 
interviewers. The sample of this study was selected from the members of the PACIS Panel. In 
order to conduct the 5th Wave of the Panel, the sample was contacted by email, text message 
and telephone (landline and mobile). 
Once contacted, the interviewees were surveyed combining two data collection tools, 
using a mixed design: the online mode through the Internet (CAWI) and by computer-assisted 
telephone interviewing (CATI). In order to obtain the sample of 1,103 interviews, 2,008 people 
belonging to the PACIS were selected. The maximum sampling error was +/- 3%. In order to 
select the sample, another applied type of sampling was a stratified selection of PACIS 
members by age groups and gender, these groups being proportional to Andalusian 
population above the age of 18. The sample was calibrated through the “raking” method, 
taking as a reference the total population of Andalusia. The raking process was conducted 
through the rake module of SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences), which implements 
these types of settings from the sample. The average interview time was 27 minutes. Statistical 
processing was conducted in SPSS. Other research data, the members of the work team, as 
well as other results can be retrieved from: https://eseis.es/investigacion/pacis. 
3.3. Dependent variable 
In order to respond to our main goal, namely trying to understand the strong belief in the idea 
that “many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never informed 
about”, the previous item was used as a dependent variable. The basic results are laid out in 
Chart 1, where 68.1% of Andalusians show a high belief that information is being withheld from 
the public8. 
  
                                            
7 The technical information about the sampling, calibration and fieldwork process was provided by the IESA-CSIC 
(Institute for Advanced Social Studies - Spanish National Research Council), Spain. 
8 To facilitate comparison with other international studies, this item was answered by the interviewees in the original 
questionnaire expressing the degree of likelihood that what the item expressed was true considering as a scale: 0% – 
certainly not, 10% - extremely unlikely, 20%-very unlikely, 30% - unlikely, 40% - somewhat unlikely, 50% - undecided, 
60% - somewhat likely, 70% - likely, 80% - very likely, 90% - extremely likely and 100% - certain (Bruder, Haffke, 
Neave, Nouripanah & Imhoff, 2013). 
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Chart 1: Degree of agreement with the claim that “many very important things happen 
in the world which the public is never informed about”. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
4. Results 
4.1. Bivariate analysis 
Several bivariate analyses9 were performed to find out which issues put to Andalusians were 
statistically related to a high belief in the withholding of information from the public (as a 
dependent variable). Simple binary regression analysis was also conducted with the variables 
statistically related to the previous belief. 
A greater high belief that the public is misinformed is linked in our study to different 
socio-demographic factors such as age, education, employment situation or occupation. We 
have found greater mistrust in the information received among the youngest interviewees 
(18-44 years old), university students, and uneducated persons (in a non-linear relationship), 
people who work and, to a greater extent, technicians and professionals, as well as service 
workers, if we look at the occupational categories. 
Regarding religion and ideology, we found that atheists and non-believers are among the 
sectors with the greatest mistrust in information received, as well as segments more 
associated with left-wing ideology than other ideologies, where we also found people who 
mistrusted the information received. Through variables such as Andalusians’ memory vote 
recall and voting intention we can see that voters of Unidos Podemos and Ciudadanos, who 
are also the youngest and greater social media consumers in our investigation, are more likely 
to show a high belief that the public is not informed of some important events. 
It was also discovered that the tendency to find the belief in the concealment of 
information was more likely in cases with an equally high belief in other generic conspiracy 
theory beliefs about which interviewees were asked, specifically through the items included 
in the aforementioned “Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ):” “politicians usually do 
not tell us the true motives for their decisions,” “government agencies closely monitor all 
citizens,” “events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret 
activities,” “there are secret organisations that greatly influence political decisions.” 
                                            
9 Statistical tests such as Chi2 or analysis of variance (ANOVA), according to the character of the variables, in relation 
to the dependent variable to be explained. 
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On the other hand, it was found that several aspects such as use of free time and access, 
use and frequency of use of communication technologies were linked in this study to having 
doubts about the information received. Thus, Andalusians citing among their free-time 
activities “browsing social media, chats, etc.” are more likely to show a high belief in the 
withholding of information. We found the same tendency among users of communication 
technologies such as mobile phones to make calls or texting, computers, email, WhatsApp or 
another app, virtual social media (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) or tablets (iPad, e-book, 
etc.). 
This is also linked to the frequency of use of these technologies, noting that a high 
frequency of use of these technologies by Andalusians (one or more times per day or 
constantly), as well as recent access to them, was linked to a high belief in the likelihood that 
“many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never informed about.” 
On the other hand, it was also found that a greater mistrust in the information received 
was linked to a greater diversity in the use of social media and, in that respect, when 
Andalusians showed this greater diversity of use (participating in social media, forums, chats, 
instant messaging, calls, video conferences, carrying out administrative tasks, searching for 
information or documentation, etc., online buying and selling, accessing, downloading or 
using audiovisual material, uploading photos or videos), the tendency to believe to a greater 
extent the hypothesis that information “is being withheld” was more prominent. 
Another matter of great concern is one related to trust. In this regard, the bivariate 
analysis revealed that a greater mistrust on the Internet (through the item: “websites try to 
prevent us from knowing what they are going to do with our personal data”) was linked to 
greater mistrust in the information received by the public. 
An interesting element originates in the verification of the relationship between the 
degree of trust shown towards different aspects (interpersonal trust, trust in the media and 
social networks, trust in institutions and leaders) and the belief in the likelihood that the 
public received quality information. The average values of trust in different aspects are shown 
on Chart 2. The line reflects the global degree of trust obtained for each aspect. The bars 
compare the segment that showed a high belief in each item compared to those showing a 
medium or low likelihood in relation to this belief. 
In line with the analysis of variance conducted, regarding trust in magazines or 
interpersonal trust, trust in NGOs, scientists or political parties, the differences between both 
segments are not statistically significant. However, we identified a statistically significant 
tendency to support the conspiracy theory about the withholding of information about the 
world to the public when showing greater trust in digital newspapers, blogs, or social media. 
In turn, those believing less in that conspiracy theory showed greater average trust in 
television, paper-based newspapers, magazines or radio, as well as in institutions such as the 
Spanish Parliament, judicial power, the media, banks, State security forces and bodies, the 
pharmaceutical industry, large multinational companies or religious leaders. Or in reverse: 
we have found that lower trust in the aforementioned media, institutions or leaders is linked 
to a greater belief in the withholding of information about important events happening in the 
world. 
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Chart 2: Degree of interpersonal trust, in the media and social media, institutions and 
leaders, in relation to the belief in the degree of likelihood that “many very important 
things happen in the world, which the public is never informed about”. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Note: The chart reflects average values based on a scale of 
responses where 0 means “no trust” and 10 means “total trust.” 
Other aspects we gathered information on were the opinion on traditional media in Spain 
(press, radio and TV), as well as on new online media. Concerning this aspect, we found a 
greater tendency towards a high belief in the withholding of information, both among the 
most critical Andalusians –regardless of the media– and those agreeing that the media are 
serving the government and manipulating public opinion or those believing that the media lie 
deliberately and agreeing less that information is cross-checked and verified. A similar 
tendency was found regarding online media in Spain. In conclusion, in the bivariate analysis 
we found several signs of connections between aspects such as socio-demographic variables, 
consumption patterns and trust in different social media and belief in the withholding of 
information. 
4.2. Multiple binary logistic regression analysis 
As a consequence of the preceding analyses, in this section we consider which aspects already 
assessed through bivariate analysis have a greater predictive capacity of the high belief in the 
assertion that “many very important things happen in the world, which the public is never 
informed about”. In order to answer this question, we conducted a multiple binary logistic 
regression analysis considering as a dependent variable the degree of likelihood of occurrence 
expressed regarding the previous item. This variable was dichotomised with 1 representing 
the “high belief (70%-100% probability)” in this conspiracy theory about the withholding of 
information and 0 representing “remaining cases” (representing a medium or low belief in 
this theory). 
The goal was to identify through regression the factors helping to better predict this high 
belief, associated in our case to a greater degree of suspicion or mistrust of the information 
received. Binary logistic regression is a technique that studies the probability of occurrence 
of the assessed event (the high belief in this theory). Table 1 synthesises the dimensions and 
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aspects explored through regression statistical analysis, among which the existence of a 
statistically significant association (via bivariate analysis and through several simple binary 
logistic regression analysis) had already been confirmed: 
 
Table 1: Dimensions studied through multiple binary logistic regression. 
Independent Dependent 
Socio-demographic 
Age 
Religious definition 
Religious practice 
Level of education 
Employment situation 
Occupation 
Ideology 
Voting intention 
Vote recall 
 
Index of generic beliefs in 
conspiracy theories 
Trust 
Interpersonal trust 
Trust in leaders and institutions 
Trust in media and social media 
Trust in the Internet’s security and 
privacy 
 
 
Diversity of use of social media 
 
 
 
Belief that “many very 
important things 
happen in the world, 
which the public is 
never informed about” 
Source: Own elaboration. 
During the analytical process, the variables described in the previous table were 
introduced in different stages throughout the procedure “Introduce” in the SPSS program, 
assessing whether the incorporation of independent variables achieved a significant increase 
in the global adjustment of each resulting statistical model. The omnibus tests reflect a better 
adjustment in the explanation of the dependent variable when introducing into the model the 
independent variables when Chi-square’s significance is < 0.05, as happens in our case. This 
means that independent variables help explain the dependent variable (Table 1). On the other 
hand, the goodness of fit of the global model, or its explanatory power, measured through 
Nagelkerke’s coefficient of determination, R2, indicates that the model can explain 59% of the 
variance of the dependent variable. This model was able to correctly classify a high percentage 
of cases (85.7%) and also obtained a high score regarding sensitivity, being able to diagnose 
92.9% of high belief in the withholding of information (see Table 1). 
Throughout the analysis, the hypothesis is that there are several factors helping to 
explain that part of Andalusians have a high belief in the withholding of information. The 
objective of the regression is to try to identify the variables that best predict this high belief, 
related in our case to a higher degree of suspicion or mistrust in the information received. In 
relation to socio-demographic profiles, we found that secondary studies are predisposed to 
score higher in high belief in the withholding of information, as well as, with regard to those 
who work, doing housework also has significant partial effects in the explanation of this belief 
when other constant variables are maintained. 
Regarding politics, under the regression model, mistrust of the information received is 
more likely to increase among PSOE supporters in voting intention and those declaring not 
to know who to vote at the time the survey was conducted, in contrast to possible voters of 
the PP. Additionally, in preliminary bivariate analysis, the intention to vote for Unidos 
Podemos or Ciudadanos or other parties proved to be statistically significant compared to 
voters of the PP, the latter being less likely to express mistrust in information. 
On the other hand, we verified that belief in other conspiracy theories from 4 items of 
the aforementioned “Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire” (Bruder et al., 2013 and Imhoff & 
Bruder, 2013) was accompanied by a greater likelihood of showing a high belief in the 
withholding of information. 
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We also built a synthetic index reflecting the diversity of use of social media among 
Andalusians (from participating in social networks, forums, chats, instant messaging, calls, 
and video conferences; to meeting new people, flirting, carrying out administrative tasks, 
searching for information or documentation, etc., buying and selling online, accessing, 
downloading or using audiovisual material, uploading photos or videos, and maintaining their 
own blog or web page). The index was built based on 7 variables. Regarding the dependent 
variable, we found that a greater diversity in the use of social media was linked to a higher 
probability to believe that the withholding of information is very likely. 
Greater trust in social media like Facebook, Twitter or Instagram conveys a greater risk 
of a high belief in the conspiracy theory that we do not receive all the important information, 
compared to those who have less trust in social media. Furthermore, the Andalusians most 
suspicious of what websites do with our personal data face the risk of believing that it is very 
likely that information is being withheld. Finally, we also noted that, the greater the trust in 
religious leaders and scientists, the less likely it is to distrust the information received. 
In accordance with the values in Exp(B) -measuring the strength of the relationship of 
each variable from the model with the dependent variable-, the seemingly more relevant 
aspects of our model, as seen in Table 1, are related to variables such as education, 
employment situation, voting intention and belief in generic conspiracy theories, although 
the model would not reach the same predictive capacity if it is not included the 
aforementioned set of factors. 
 
Table 1: Multiple binary logistic regression. Variables explaining the high belief that “Many 
very important things happen in the world, which the public is never informed about”. 
  B E.T. Wald gl Sig. Exp(B) 
Constant -3.826 1.864 4.214 1 .040 .022 
Level of education 
(Basis=University)   
6.864 2 .032 
 
Uneducated (1) .677 .503 1.812 1 .178 1.968 
Secondary education (2) 1.174 .448 6.857 1 .009 3.235 
Employment situation 
(Basis=Employed)   
6.624 4 .157 
 
Housework (4) 1.418 .683 4.303 1 .038 4.128 
Voting intention (Basis=PP) 
  
10.026 8 .263 
 
PSOE (1) 2.076 .846 6.022 1 .014 7.975 
Undecided (7) 1.499 .631 5.640 1 .018 4.476 
Index of belief in generic 
conspiracy theories  
.785 .112 48.825 1 .000 2.191 
Diversity in social media 
participation 
.432 .188 5.303 1 .021 1.540 
Trust in social media 
(Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, etc.)  
.198 .086 5.357 1 .021 1.219 
Degree of agreement: 
Websites are trying to 
conceal what they are going 
to do with our personal data  
.431 .171 6.357 1 .012 1.539 
Degree of trust in religious 
leaders 
-.210 .103 4.144 1 .042 .810 
Degree of trust in scientists -.267 .131 4.130 1 .042 .766 
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Information about the regression model 
-2LL 306.288   
Omnibus Tests χ² 238,885, df=63, p<,001   
Cox y Snell R² 41.80% Global classification accuracy 85.7% 
Nagelkerke R² 59.0% Specificity 69.5% 
Hosmer & Lemeshow test p=0.591 Sensitivity 92.9% 
*=p<,05; **=p<,01; ***=p<,001. 
 
Explanatory note: This is a synthetic table, which allows us to identify the more significant relationships. 
In the omnibus test, if the model is significant (less than 0.05), this means that independent variables 
help explain the dependent. Specificity refers to the percentage of non-occurrence correctly predicted 
(medium or low belief) and the sensitivity is the percentage of occurrence correctly predicted (in this 
case, the high belief in the withholding of information). Regarding the table’s coefficients (B), if the 
significance (Sig.) of each coefficient linked to the study’s variables is less than 0.05, this means this 
independent variable explains the dependent. The sign of the coefficient (B) indicates the direction of 
this relationship. The exponential value of B (Exp(B) refers to the strength of the relationship of the 
variable with the dependent. If it moves away from 1, the relationship is stronger. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In light of this research, which has documented that Andalusians are exposed to multiple 
sources of information, it is difficult to imagine totally effective strategies to reverse, in our 
scenario, the high tendency to mistrust the received information. This raises significant and 
difficult challenges in terms of information and communication, but also for experts in social 
and educational intervention and for awareness and education about a responsible use of 
social media. 
Two conclusions from the analysis we conducted are, in our view, evident. On the one 
hand, we established the high degree of mistrust shown by Andalusians towards the 
information they receive, to the extent that they sense that there is a withholding of relevant 
events which they are not informed about. This issue, taking into account that seven out of 
ten Andalusians believe this, directly refers us back to credibility and mistrust problems. 
On the other hand, our research data show that there are different factors to consider in 
order to explain the high belief in the deficiency of the information received. Some variables 
matter more than others, but we found an improvement in the explanation and understanding 
of Andalusians’ belief in the withholding of information when socio-demographic and 
ideological dimensions are simultaneously combined, and when taking into account in the 
design of the statistical model aspects such as the degree of trust shown towards different 
institutions, leaders, mass media or social media, as well as the way they approach social 
media or the very tendency of believing in global conspiracies. For example, even though the 
left-wing electorate appears to be generally more critical and distrustful, compared to the 
right-wing electorate, other factors such as age (being the youngest, those with a more active 
and diverse use of social media) also play a role in the explanation of the belief in the 
withholding of information. It was therefore noted in our data the complex and multifactorial 
character of the study of these types of belief. 
In the coming years, given the effects that the lack of trust in information may have in 
delegitimising institutions and other domains, it is a matter of urgency to commit to fact-
checking strategies and tools that make it possible to recover trust in information. Equally 
important are educational and intervention actions with the public in order to promote 
critical learning on how to approach information in our current societies. 
On the other hand, given the difficulty of both identifying and managing false 
information, there is a need for an inter- and transdisciplinary approach, where the 
collaboration of different disciplines (communication, sociology, psychology, education, 
social work, etc., as well as those approaching issues related to social media security) allows 
Gualda, E. & Rúas, J. 
Conspiracy theories, credibility and trust in information 
ISSN 2386-7876 – © 2019 Communication & Society, 32(1), 179-194 
191 
us to respond to and counteract how rapidly fake news and disinformation arise in a Spanish 
sociological context with a lack of commitment to institutions, as evidenced by the data from 
this study’s survey or others at a national level. This data equally show that the population 
perceives that institutions such as the Parliament, to cite a relevant example, do not worry 
about the problems Spaniards are actually interested in10. 
However, we must not forget that there is a confirmation bias, a human tendency to 
obtain information that fits our belief systems, playing an essential role in the cascading 
generation of information. This is in addition to a selective exposure to messages which 
facilitates the formation of echo-chambers, notably groups of individuals and ideas acquiring, 
reinforcing and shaping their preferred narrative and where dissident information is ignored, 
as noted in recent discussions on controversial topics at a national level –as was the case in 
the Colombian peace process or the United Kingdom’s Brexit–, and that led to a strong 
polarisation of the opinions spread by social media, which facilitated the detection of 
numerous fake and misleading news (Del Vicario et al., 2018). 
Ultimately, the road to credibility and reputation leads through the necessary resilience 
in organising information and curating content (Hernández, 2017). This path also involves 
acknowledging the change in the cognitive, emotional and sociocultural order of virtual 
communities, which occurs through new expressive and collaborative-writing practices in 
message production and narrative, and the construction of a shared reality. 
 
This article is part of the work developed within the framework of two research projects: 
“XESCOM: Red Internacional de Investigación de la Gestión de la Comunicación” (ED341D R2016/019), a 
project coordinated by the Universidade de Santiago de Compostela’s Novos Medios group, with the 
groups iMARKA, from the Universidade de A Coruña, CP2 and BiFEGA from the Universidade de Vigo, 
funded by means of competitive tendering by the Consellería de Cultura, Educación y Ordenación 
Universitaria of the Xunta de Galicia; and the R&D project “DEBATv, Debates Electorales Televisados en 
España: Modelos, Proceso, Diagnóstico y Propuesta” (CSO2017-83159-R) funded by the Spanish Ministry 
of Science, Innovation and Universities and the Spanish State Research Agency, supported by the 
European Union’s European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Furthermore, this work falls under 
the COST Action (H2020) on “Comparative Analysis of Conspiracy Theories” (COMPACT, 2016-2020), 
funded by the European Union’s Framework Programme Horizon 2020. In Andalusia, it is part of the 
research project “Teorías de la conspiración y desinformación”, which won a competition to conduct a 
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